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Any recent visitor to Ethiopia would be struck by the ubiquitous billboards commemorating the 
late Prime Minister’s life, two months 
after his demise. Meles Zenawi’s 
photo forms the backdrop to the TV 
screens and adorns the streets of all the 
major towns and villages. These sights 
were supplemented by the chorus 
of African leaders that attended the 
PM’s funeral and who lavished praise 
on this “dedicated son of African 
soil.” He was depicted as the untiring 
leader who toiled for the upliftment of 
the indigent peoples of Ethiopia and 
Africa. Among this choir were African 
presidents and prime ministers whose 
own policies have degraded the lives of 
their people. The least distinguished of 
these visitors were the former President 
and Prime Minister of Somalia whose 
tenure in power was marred by their 
total subservience to the Ethiopian 
regime. 
One wonders if this orchestrated 
and well managed public love of the 
late Zenawi reflects the thoughts and 
feeling of the peoples of Ethiopia and 
the neighboring states where the PM’s 
policies had the greatest footprint. 
Putting aside the propaganda of 
the Ethiopian governing party, the 
admiration of his cohort of political 
friends, and partisan Ethiopian critics, 
most objective analysts would agree 
that, unlike the visiting African leaders, 
Zenawi left behind a record that 
deserves critical scrutiny. Zenawi’s 
legacy can be viewed through two 
analytical lenses: a) his domestic 
footprint; (b) and his regional impact. 
To assess the PM’s legacy we need to 
understand the political and economic 
context of Ethiopia and the Horn of 
Africa when Zenawi and his party, the 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), 
came to power in 1991. First, Ethiopia 
had been devastated by a brutal military 
dictatorship that massacred hundreds 
of thousands of people, which it also 
presided over the catastrophic famine 
of 1984 that devastated several 
regions of the country. Additionally, 
the military regime wasted Ethiopia’s 
meagre and precious resources to 
oppress the legitimate struggle of 
the Eritrean people, as well as others 
inside Ethiopia, such as Tigray, Somali, 
and the Oromos, to mention a few. 
War, famine, and oppression were 
the hallmark of Ethiopia in 1990, 
and the regime was exhausted and 
had run out of ideas and energy to 
move the country beyond multiple 
calamities.  Then came the last drive 
of the Eritrean resistance against the 
regime since they already controlled 
the entire countryside and surrounded 
the capital Asmara. Their ally in 
Ethiopia (TPLF) then pushed towards 
Addis Ababa and within a couple 
of months it became clear that the 
regime’s days were numbered. Given 
the ethnic character of the TPLF it was 
not clear whether its takeover of the 
capital would induce a new civil war 
with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 
and other communities. Concerned 
about the possibility of having another 
failed state in the region, with all the 
attendant problems such as a tidal 
wave of refugees, the United States 
brokered an agreement between the 
regime and the TPLF. This pact allowed 
for a “peaceful” takeover of the capital 
and Mengistu’s departure for exile. 
The TPLF brought with it a client 
group of ethnic political parties, the 
so-called PDOs (People’s Democratic 
Organisations), who jointly formed 
what became known as EPRDF. But 
there has never been any doubt that 
TPLF controlled the levers of power 
in the country. The junior partners 
of the “coalition” were supposed to 
provide national legitimacy for the 
new ethnic authority. However, the 
Ethiopian public largely considered 
the PDOs as lackeys. The independent 
Oromo Liberation Front, which initially 
joined the ruling coalition, failed to 
understand TPLF’s militarist agenda 
and paid the ultimate price as the 
latter swiftly destroyed its military 
base. After this defeat OLF went 
underground where it has virtually 
become inconsequential. Establishing 
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the new order and consolidating the 
TPLF’s power took nearly a decade, 
after which the regime turned more of 
its attention to other matters. 
After twenty one years in power, we 
can emphatically state that Zenawi’s 
regime has been a Janus-faced order. 
Its political rhetoric exuded democracy, 
peace, national harmony, and 
development, but behind that facade 
was a determined security apparatus 
that crushed even the most democratic 
attempts to challenge its authority. 
This rhetoric proved seductive enough 
for outsiders, but all indications are that 
it has failed to sway a majority of the 
population. It is these two faces of the 
regime that the remaining section of 
this brief will focus on. But I must first 
provide an explanatory note about the 
nationalist character of the regime. I can 
categorically state that the late Premier 
Zenawi was an Ethiopian nationalist, 
despite the claims of some of the 
opponents that he was building Tigray 
for an eventual secession, if needs be. 
Many critics of the TPLF regime claim 
that it exploited the resources of most 
regions in Ethiopia to develop its home 
province. There is a grain of truth to this 
assertion, but I would suggest that to be 
a nationalist does not exclude a regime 
from internally differentiating regions 
by privileging some over others. Most 
critics do not understand that there 
are two kinds of nationalists: Civic and 
sectarian nationalists. 
Civic nationalists genuinely try to 
treat all regions and citizens alike and 
fairly. In contrast, sectarian nationalists 
protect the territorial integrity of the 
country but also establish a hierarchy of 
power which privileges certain groups 
and political factions. Zenawi and his 
regime represented the latter version 
of nationalism and are not alone in this 
regard in the developing world. 
Domestic Footprint 
Zenawi’s group and those they 
invited to take part in the political 
conference in the early 1990s 
produced a constitution which 
nominally privileged ethnic identity. 
They subsequently divided the country 
into ethnic provinces. There is little 
doubt that this political architecture 
gave modest advantages to most 
ethnic groups in the country who 
were the subjects of the empire, but 
such gains belied the fact that Addis 
Ababa remained the decisive power 
centre of the country. More critically, 
a small group of TPLF cadres and the 
security establishment they strategically 
controlled have had the final say about 
all the major issues. Even when the 
affiliates of the TPLF became senior 
ministers they remained pliant cadres 
without a backbone. I have witnessed 
the humiliation that comes with such 
status.  The absence of any degree of 
autonomy on the part of those affiliates 
manifestly demonstrates that belonging 
to EPRDF has been like George Orwell’s 
Animal Farm where “All animals are 
created equal but some animals are 
created more equal than others.” 
Despite cowing their partners and 
most of the population, Zenawi and his 
regime can legitimately claim several 
major accomplishments:  
First, the regime has created a 
physical infrastructure for the country 
that is better than what was left behind 
by all the previous regimes combined. 
The road network that spans to most 
regions of the country can facilitate 
national integration and development 
if progressively used. Second, the 
number of public universities has 
increased substantially over the last 
decade and this has allowed many 
young Ethiopians to gain access to 
some form of higher education. 
Third, the electrical grid of the 
country has been expanded and more 
hydroelectric dams have been built 
or are under construction and this 
has expanded the country’s energy 
supply. Some of these dams were 
initiated illegally because other riparian 
countries that have a stake in the rivers 
were not consulted and no agreements 
were reached to satisfy all parties. 
Despite such illegal and unethical pre-
emptions, the growth in electricity 
production bodes well for the country’s 
economic growth. 
Fourth, an intensive regime of 
mineral exploration has been put in 
place which could deliver dividends for 
the country in the long run. Fifth, Zenawi 
and his team have not ameliorated the 
population’s vulnerability to famine, 
but fortunately the country has avoided 
the catastrophic famines that used to 
take hundreds of thousands of lives. 
Finally, there is has been an increase 
in the volume of foreign investment in 
the country and the rate of economic 
growth has been substantial despite 
starting from a very low base.  
The regime’s liabilities are also 
numerous but here is a sample of 
the major ones. First, in spite of the 
seemingly smooth transfer of authority 
to the Deputy Prime Minister, power 
is still wielded by individuals without 
legitimate institutional anchors. As 
such, authority in Ethiopia is extremely 
concentrated in two nodes that 
completely overlap: the TPLF core, 
and the security establishment. The 
ultimate anchor of power is the security 
apparatus which has been loyal to 
the TPLF rather than the country and 
the constitution. Such concentration 
of power has enfeebled all other 
institutions and has created a political 
culture and society deeply marooned 
in fear rather than genuine loyalty and 
respect for national institutions. The 
political and social consequences of 
this republic of fear are far reaching. 
Second, although the economic 
sphere has been somewhat more 
liberalised, loyalty to the regime is still 
central to an entrepreneur’s ability 
to succeed. In many instances, party 
connections are essential to start a 
major business, and important sectors 
of the economy are dominated by 
the party and its friends.   Third, the 
promotion of fear has suffocated the 
entire political spectrum through its 
unwillingness to tolerate even a minor 
political opposition. By claiming to win 
over 95 percent of the votes in the 
last election, the regime has created a 
make-believe world where it is adored 
by all. 
Fourth, in some parts of the 
developing world academics are 
not free to present their ideas/work 
regarding their countries’ ailments, and 
Ethiopia appears to be the model of 
academic unfreedom. This has been 
accomplished through the elimination 
of tenure or long term contracts for 
faculty and the appointment of political 
loyalists to top academic positions. If a 
professor indulges in critical analysis 
of the political and development 
affairs of the country, there is little 
chance that his or her contract will 
be renewed. Fear is the life blood of 
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this system and compels productive 
academics to either leave the country 
if they can, or languish in the margins, 
or simply become sycophants of the 
regime to maintain their livelihoods. 
Nevertheless, there are a few 
courageous scholars who have stayed 
true to the ethos of the academy and 
still remain in the country against 
incredible odds. 
Fifth, poor people dominate the 
landscape of Ethiopian cities and 
towns, and the UN has reported that 
over 80% of the building structures of 
the capital are of slum quality. Mindful 
of this image, the regime has embarked 
on urban renewal that will ultimately 
remove most of the poor from the 
city and allocate the “freed” spaces to 
shopping malls and investors. It intends 
to house the indigents removed from 
those areas in apartments built on the 
outskirts of the city without examining 
alternative schemes that will keep these 
residents in their neighbourhoods. 
Finally, the collective effect of these 
liabilities is that public institutions 
in the country are beholden to the 
individuals in power rather that 
embodying national ethos. The 
shameless use of the security forces to 
retain power or intimidate the political 
opposition, and the culture of fear this 
engenders means that Premier Zenawi 
and his regime reinforced institutions 
the public fears but they have failed 
to create legitimacy for the post-1991 
institutions. Without legitimate 
institutions that are autonomous from 
particular leaders, the country remains 
in danger of fully sliding into an ethnic 
political strife. 
The Regional Impact 
The “winds of change” in the 
Horn of Africa in 1990/1991 created 
opportunities which could have 
produced a bright future for all. 
Post-1991 Eritrean and Ethiopian 
leaders were cut from the same political 
cloth since they closely collaborated in 
the battle field to dislodge the Mengistu 
regime. Nevertheless, one major factor 
separated the two movements: one was 
mainly a national liberation movement 
while the other was primarily an ethnic 
liberation project. On the Eastern 
front, Somalia provided material and 
diplomatic support for the leadership 
of both the Eritrean and Ethiopian 
liberation fronts, and the Somali people 
keenly followed the advances of the 
two fronts against Mengisu’s military 
while they also hoped for the fall of the 
Somali dictator. I remember visiting the 
border regions of Ethiopia and Somalia 
after the fall of Mengistu and Siyaad 
Barre where I saw the population relish 
their new freedoms on either side of 
the border. The hope was that a new 
and more progressive political chapter 
for the region was in the offing. 
But the new lords of Ethiopia 
were steeped in a sanitised imperial 
orthodoxy. During the first decade in 
power, Zenawi and his subordinates 
adopted the same ethnic political 
logic, tested in Ethiopia’s ethnic 
provinces, to manipulate Somali affairs 
in the old Republic. The authorities 
in Addis Ababa made no effort to 
reach out to Somali civics, but instead 
chose warlords and sectarian political 
actors as their best collaborators. 
Once the Somali people realised 
Ethiopia’s new strategy of “divide and 
rule” old animosities resurfaced and 
the Ethiopian occupation of parts of 
the Somali Republic and its invasion 
of their country and capital in 
2006-08 dashed the last residue of 
good will. Nearly all Somali civic 
nationalists now see Ethiopia as an 
enduring enemy. 
In the north, the Ethiopian and 
Eritrean leaders who claimed to be the 
best of friends slowly drifted towards 
conflict and imposed a horrible, 
costly, and unnecessary war on the 
population. The goodwill which has 
been nurtured in the battlefield of 
liberation vanished. After a devastating 
war which wasted over 100,000 
lives, the two regimes consented to 
arbitration. An international boundary 
commission was set and both 
governments guaranteed to accept 
the commission’s findings. Eritrea 
immediately embraced the findings 
once the commission rendered 
its verdict. Unfortunately Ethiopia 
has yet to honour its commitment 
as it introduced new conditions to 
the process and the international 
community has failed to enforce the 
commission’s ruling. Consequently and 
unfortunately the two countries remain 
in a virtual state of war. 
The Verdict
There is little doubt that history 
will judge Premier Zenawi as 
one of the two major leaders in 
Ethiopian history. His regime will be 
remembered for holding Ethiopia 
together as one country even under 
the centripetal ethnic order which his 
regime officially introduced. Second, 
Ethiopian nationalists will celebrate 
him as the man who invaded Somalia 
and occupied Mogadishu. Third, his 
government will be highly regarded 
for developing the country’s physical 
and educational infrastructure, and 
for refreshingly having the ambition of 
becoming a developmental state. What 
Ethiopian democrats will not forgive 
is the regime’s failure to establish a 
political order and national institutions 
that have earned the loyalty and 
respect of the people. The conflation of 
the regime’s interests with the national 
cause and the use of the security forces 
to domesticate the population is not 
a sustainable strategy if Ethiopia is to 
ever evolve into a vibrant democracy. 
The republic of fear must give way 
to the rule of law to thwart a more 
foreboding future. 
On the regional front, posterity will 
not be kind to the Zenawi regime as it 
has totally squandered the opportunity 
to forge a more peaceful and 
collaborative relations with Eritrea and 
Somalia given the goodwill of these 
two peoples.  Allowing Somalis the 
opportunity to rebuild their government 
and society in a democratic fashion 
would have eliminated traditional 
hostilities between the two countries 
and boosted their mutuality. Further, 
this approach would have shifted 
hundreds of millions of dollars from 
the war machine to development 
which is desperately need. Instead of 
building on that goodwill the regime 
embarked on a reign of terror to 
destabilise Eritrea and keep Somalia 
in its catastrophic condition. Sadly, 
the attempt to impose regional 
tyranny will ricochet on Ethiopia and 
perpetuate the misery of all the 
peoples in the region.  It is not too 
late to change course and anchor 
developments on the significant and 
positive elements of the last two 
decades, but will there be the wisdom 
and the will in Addis Ababa?  
